ADVICE

Given to the

Republick of VENICE.

How they ought to Govern themselves both at home and abroad, to have perpetual Dominion.

First Written in *Italian* by that Great Politician and Lover of his Country, Father *PAUL* the *Venetian*, Author of the Council of *Trent*.

Translated into English by Dr. *AGLIONBY*.

Dedicated to his Excellency the Lord Lieutenant of *Ireland*.

LONDON,
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TO HIS

EXCELLENCY

HENRY,

Viſcount *Sydney*,

Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, *Gentleman of the Bed-Chamber to Their Majeſties, and one of Their Majeſties moſt Honourable Privy-Council.*

My Lord,

THough your deſign'd Favours to me might juſtly claim this offer of my Reſpects in a Dedication, yet I muſt own, That it is

not only Gratitude that requires me to make this return, but it is my Choice and Judgment that prompts me to take the Liberty of putting this Piece under your Protection. And indeed, if I regard either the Greatneſs of your Family, or your own Perſonal Endowments, where could I have found a more Illuſtrious Name, or a more generally own'd Deſert.

The *Sydneys* have fill'd our *Engliſh* Hiſtory, and adorn'd our Nation; Great in Employments both at Home and Abroad, but more Glorious in aſſerting conſtantly their Country's true Intereſt:

And

And your Lordſhip has not been wanting to follow ſuch Honourable Examples, firſt, by a ſteddy adherence to all the meaſures that could be entred into by a wiſe man in times full of dark deſigns; and then (as ſoon as your Countries Good requir'd it) by boldly laying aſide all dubious Counſels, to appear in Arms with our Great and Glorious Deliverer, His Preſent Majeſty.

Amongſt the Thanks we owe to all thoſe who have done the like, I think no one can more juſtly be extoll'd by this, or recommended to the eſteem and admirati-

on of the next Age, than your Lordſhip.

In your Negotiation in *Holland*, during the cloſe Intrigues of the latter end of King *Charles* his Reign, you ſtrove to keep both him and us happy and quiet, by promoting the true Intereſt of both: But when the Ferment of our Affairs forc'd you to more ſenſible demonſtrations of your thoughts, you Nobly choſe rather to appear an ill Courtier, than be thought an ill Man to your Country. The Proteſtant Intereſt carried it with you, while the *Roman* Faction thought their deſigns as ſecure as they were

were deeply laid. 'Tis rare to find ſuch Conduct and Courage in a Publick Miniſter: But what could be expected leſs from one ready to venture his Life in the Field at the Head of our Nation abroad, againſt that unquiet Monarch who was then invading all the Liberty Mankind had left.

Heaven, My Lord, has at laſt bleſs'd theſe conſtant endeavours for *England's* Proſperity, and we ſee you in the Councils and Privacy of a Prince born for our Felicity.

The Great Queen of this Monarchy, who ſo lov'd her

People, and underſtood their Intereſt, had a *Sydney* for her Favourite, and ſuch a man as ſhe admir'd living, and lamented dead; and our King, who has begun with reſtoring this Nation to its true Intereſt, and will, no queſtion, advance its Glory to the higheſt pitch, has your Lordſhip in his Councils and Arms, Guarded by you in the day, he ſleeps often under your care in the Night, ſafe in your Loyalty, and pleas'd in your attendance.

To whom then could I more properly offer theſe *Arcanums* of a Wiſe Government, than to one who muſt be

be a good Judge of all Writings of that kind; and therefore with repeated Offers of my humble Reſpects, and readineſs to obey your Lordſhip's Commands, I take leave, and am,

My Lord,

Your Lordſhip's

Moſt Humble and moſt

Devoted Obedient Servant,

W. Aglionby.

THE

PREFACE.

THat Padre Paulo Sarpi, *of the Order of the* Servites, *is the Author of this Treatiſe, there needs no other proof than the reading of it; for whoever is acquainted either with his ſtyle, or his manner of thinking, muſt of neceſſity acknowledge, that they are both here. And indeed we may ſay, that this is not only a true repreſentation of the Government of the* Venetian *Republick, but that the Author alſo (like great* Painters,

ers, *who in all their Works give us their own* Genius *with the mixture of the Repreſentation*) *has likewiſe drawn the trueſt Picture of himſelf. He was one of the greateſt men of his Age, of vaſt Natural Parts, to which he had added all the acquir'd ones that great Study and much Converſation with Men could give him: It was he who defended the Republick in the diſpute they had with Pope* Paul *the* 5th; *which he did ſo ſolidly, and yet ſo modeſtly, that his Subject never carried him either to Invectives or Railleries, unbeſeeming the Gravity of the Matter, nor the Dignity of the Perſons whoſe Cauſe he managed; that Quarrel being*

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accommodated by the interpoſition of the Kings of France *and* Spain, *in which the Republick had all the advantage poſſible: The Senate, very ſenſible of the Obligation they had to* P. Paulo, *made him* Conſultor of State, *and added an Honourable Penſion for his Life, giving him at the ſame time Order to view all their ſecret Records, where all their Papers and Inſtruments of State were laid up; all which he reduc'd into ſuch a new order, as that they might be recurr'd to with the greateſt eaſe imaginable upon all occaſions. The Eſteem they made of his Abilities was ſo great, that they never had any important debate in which either*

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by publick order, or by the private application of ſome of their Senators, they did not take his advice; which moſt commonly was aſſented to afterwards. Towards the latter end of his Life, the Inquiſitors of State *ſeeing that they could not hope long for the continuation of thoſe Oracles, reſolv'd, that once for all he ſhould impart them his thoughts upon the whole Conſtitution of their Government, and withal, add his Opinion touching their Future Conduct both within and without; and that is this Piece with which I now preſent the Publick. As it was made for the peruſal of thoſe only who were the participants of all the* Arcanums *of the Empire,*

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it is writ with leſs regard to the Publick Cenſure, to which he ſuppos'd it would never be ſubject. All other Writers of Politicks may in one thing be juſtly ſuſpected, which is, that when they write with a deſign of publiſhing their Works to Mankind, they muſt have a regard to many conſiderations both of the times they write in, and Opinions that are then receiv'd by the People, as alſo to the Eſtabliſh'd Forms both of Government and Religion; beſides that Self-love too will not let them forget their own Glory, for the ſake of which they often ſwerve from the true Rules of writing; but here all theſe conſiderations ceas'd; the Work is directed

rected to those whose Interest it was to conceal it: And for the Author himself, it may be said, it was rather his Legacy than any desire of shewing his Abilities, which by other Pieces of his were already sufficiently publish'd to the World. But what an Idea *must we have of that Man whom a* Venetian Senate *not only admitted to their Debates, but consulted upon the whole Frame of their Government; a* Senate, *I say, justly deserving the Titles of* Wise *and* Great; *who have maintain'd their State for* 1200 *years, with little alteration; who have been a Bulwark to the Christian World against the most potent Invader that ever was; who at the same time*

time have ſtruggled with all the Chriſtian Princes united, and headed, even by Popes, whoſe ſpiritual power alone has been able to ſubvert greater Empires: This Senate, *or at leaſt the wiſeſt of them, the* Inquiſitors of State, *who have the whole Executive Power in their hands, cannot let this Subject of theirs leave the World without having from him a Scheme of their preſent Affairs, and a proſpect of the Occurrences to come: Nothing certainly can give us a greater* Idea *of* Padre Paulo, *nor ſhew us how great Abilities in the moſt retired and concealed Subjects, will break out in all wiſe Governments, and cannot long be conceal'd.*

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As to the work it ſelf, I ſhall ſay little, it being improper to foreſtall the Reader's Judgment by mine; but I think I may venture to give him ſome cautions againſt a ſurpriſe, from ſome bold Maxims and arbitrary Poſitions which he will meet with, and perhaps not expect from one of our Author's Profeſſion, nor in the Methods of a Government which carries the ſpecious and popular Title of Liberty *in the Head of it. As to the Author, tho he were a religious man, and a very ſtrict obſerver of that Life; yet being above ordinary methods, and having a Mind elevated beyond his ſphere, he thought, that not only he might, but that he ought to go*

to the Extent of his Capacity, when he was to adviſe thoſe whom God Almighty had inveſted with Soveraign Power. This makes him lay down that great Maxim, That all is juſt that contributes to the preſervation of the Government; *and in a natural deduction from this, adviſe in ſome caſes not to ſtand upon common proceedings. I remember the Author of his Life ſays, That he had adapted moſt of the Aphoriſms of* Hippocrates, *about the Diſeaſes and Cure of the Body natural, to thoſe of the Body politick; and if ſo, he could not forget that of,*

Extremis Morbis extrema Remedia,

which alone would warrant all uncommon proceedings. Moſt

Most people have an Idea *of Commonwealths, not unlike that which* Poets *and young people have of the* Golden Age, *where they fancy, that without either labour, solicitude, or chagrin, people past their time in the Innocent Pleasures of Love and Musick, and other soft Delights; so the World imagines, that a Popular Government is all sweetness and liberty, precarious, and depending upon their Votes, free from oppression and slavery, and constant to known methods: but all this is a very wrong Conception; they are invested with Soveraign Power, and must and do use it for their own preservation, as absolutely as any Soveraign Prince in*

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the World; and whoever shall seriously consider the Machine of this Venetian *State, must own, that neither the Governors themselves, nor the people governed by them, have any such Excellent and Inviting Prerogatives, as can justly give them a Superiority to the Government of a wise Prince, and well dispos'd People in a limited Monarchy. But I have said enough of this; the Reader will best judge, whether the reading of this Book will enamour him of a Republican Government or not.*

I have no more to say, but that this is a very faithful Translation from an Original Manuscript communicated to me in Italy, *where*

where it begins to creep abroad; and if we had in England *the conveniency of Workmen that could Print* Italian *correctly, I would have publiſh'd both the Original and my Tranſlation together.*

The words of Quarantie *and* Avogadore, *may puzzle ſome people; but they will eaſily underſtand, that the firſt is a kind of* Bench of Judges *deligated out of the Body of the leſſer Nobility, for the Trial of Civil and ſome Criminal Cauſes; and the other is the Name of a great Magiſtrate in* Venice, *who among othr Priviledges, has that of carrying the Sentences of the Council of* Ten *before the great Council.*

THE

THE OPINION OF Padre Paolo,

Moſt Illuſtrious and Excellent Lords, the Inquiſitors of State,

I Write by Obedience to your Lordſhip's Commands, without Reflection upon my own ſmall Abilities, becauſe the Chief Conſideration of a Subject ought to be to obey his *Prince.*

Your Excellencies have commanded me to deliver my Opini-

on, how the *Venetian Republick* ought to regulate it ſelf, to hope for a perpetual Duration. To obtain a true Notion of this, it will be neceſſary to diſtinguiſh, and firſt to regulate the Government of the City, in which will be comprehended the manner of keeping the Nobles and the Citizens to their Duty; then look abroad to the reſt of your Dominions: and laſtly give ſome Form to the dealing with Foreign Princes.

To begin with the *Firſt*, I might in ſhort put you in mind of the Saying of St. *Bernardino* of *Siena*, to the *Doge Moro*, who ſaid, That the Republick ſhould continue ſo long as they ſhould keep to the Rule of doing Exact Juſtice; but to come nearer to the matter, and the Condition of theſe Times, we muſt reduce under that Head of Juſtice, all that contributes to the Service of the State; and, to ſpeak yet more ſuccinctly, we will lay it down

down as a Maxim, *That all is just which is any ways necessary for the maintaining of the Government.*

In the particular Government of the City, 'tis an excellent Custom to lay the Impositions as well upon the Nobility, as the rest of the Citizens. *First*, Because the Burden is less when it is general: And, *Secondly*, Because 'tis just when 'tis without Partiality. There is no doubt but it lessens something of the Splendor of the Nobility to see them tax'd particularly, since in many Governments the Nobility and Gentry, though they are Subjects, and not part of the Government, do nevertheless enjoy a Freedom from Taxes, and contribute more with their Sword than Purse, towards the Publick Charge: But since the Ancient Simplicity of our Ancestors has patiently submitted to this Yoak; and because the Priviledges of the Sword are dan-

gerous in a Commonwealth, I think 'tis advisable not to innovate in this Point, because such a change would give too much offence to the rest of your People, and too much Haughtiness to your own Nobility. 'Tis true, that when the Taxes are upon the Lands, so as to be unavoidable, it would be convenient to give the Nobility all the advantage of time for payment, and at last, if they are insolvent, it will not be amiss to neglect the rigorous Exaction of the Law, that so the Nobility be not ruin'd, because Extreams are always dangerous, and the Republick may suffer as much from having too many poor Noblemen, as from having too many rich ones; besides the Envy and Jealousie that must be in the hearts of those who shall find themselves naked, and their Equals cloathed with their Garments, and that only for not having been able to pay an Imposition laid upon them by

by other Peoples Contrivance.

There are ſome, who not making a right Judgment of things, do inveigh extreamly againſt a Cuſtom of this Republick, which is the having ſo many Offices and Places of ſo ſmall Revenue, that thoſe who enjoy them are almoſt neceſſitated to be corrupt; and ſo after they have been Judges and Governours, forc'd to come under the laſh of the Law, or to juſtifie their Integrity, if they can: This ſeems a notorious Abuſe, and carries with it ſome appearance. But however, I ſhould never adviſe to make theſe Imployments better, becauſe there reſults from this another greater advantage to the State, which is to keep the ſmall Nobility under; for they may be compar'd to the Adder, which cannot exert its Poyſon when 'tis numm'd with Cold: And if theſe Nobles, who are by inclination diſcontented, ſhould once arrive but to a Mediocrity in For-

tune, they would presently contest with the great ones, and by strength of their Numbers play some ill Trick to the Government: whereas now they are kept to their Duty, not only by Poverty, which clips the Wings of Ambition, but also by being subject to the Censure of the great ones, for having misbehav'd themselves in their Governments. Indead I could think it prudent to proceed against them something coldly, unless they are guilty of very great Enormities, such as scandalize the generality of your Subjects; for then 'tis necessary to shew a publick resentment: But otherwise I would have them handled gently, it being a kind of punishment to lye open to a Prosecution: And indeed I would never have any Nobleman, though never so guilty, be condemned to a Publick Infamous Death, because the Damage that results from thence upon the whole Order of the Nobility, when

when they are ſeen to paſs through the Hands of an Hangman, is greater than the Good of a Publick Example can avail. Neither on the other ſide would I have theſe Noblemen, thus guilty, to walk the Streets, and be ſeen in publick, becauſe then your Subjects would conceive a ſiniſter Opinion of your Juſtice; but they ſhould be kept in Priſon, or, if it be neceſſary, be privately diſpatch'd.

If theſe Criminals fly from Juſtice, then you may uſe the utmoſt ſeverity in your baniſhing of them; becauſe then it appears, that if nothing more be done, nothing more was feaſible; and let the ſame Rigour be obſerv'd in keeping them out; for ſince they are, as it were, gangreen'd Members cut off from the Body, it will not be expedient to unite them again to it with deformity of the whole.

Here I foreſee I ſhall be cenſur'd by ſome, as a bad Pilot, who en-

deavouring to ſhun *Scylla*, runs upon *Carybdis*; that is, while I aim at keeping the ſmall Nobility under, I forget the danger may ariſe from the Great, and the Rich of that Order. I ſee the Objection, but do not value it; and my Reaſon is, the long Obſervation I have made of the Nature of this City, by the ſtrength of which I dare boldly affirm, that the Republick of *Venice* will never come to its end by that which has ruin'd all other Republicks, to wit, when the power has been reduc'd firſt into a few hands, and then their Authority devolv'd upon one who has erected a *Monarchy*. The ſtrange Emulation that reigns here among the great ones, even among thoſe of the ſame Family; nay, that is between Brothers themſelves, does ſecure the Government from this danger; and if by a Suppoſition, almoſt impoſſible, all the Brothers of one Family had the power given

ven them of making a Dictator, I am confident they would never agree to chuſe one among themſelves, but would rather chuſe to be a part of the Government, divided among a Thouſand Gentlemen, than to be Princes of the Blood, and Subjects.

The Great Governments, called *Governments of Expence*, and ſo contriv'd on purpoſe by our prudent Anceſtors, to give an occaſion to thoſe who are too rich to leſſen their Riches; ought to be diſpos'd of according to the Intention of their firſt Inſtitution: That is to ſay, not to thoſe who have no means to ſuſtain ſuch a Burden, and muſt be forc'd by conſequence to compaſs them *per fas & nefas*; and if they are Honeſt, muſt do it fooliſhly, becauſe they are not wicked enough to do it knaviſhly, and ſo either acquire the Hatred of thoſe they govern, or be laugh'd at, and contemned by them. This

is a Point of great Importance; and he who goes through such an Imployment meanly, and without Expence, demerits extreamly of his Countrey, because he renders the Person that represents the State contemptible; and all Rebellions of Subjects have had their first Original Rise from the Contempt of the Prince.

The Contests that happen between Nobleman and Nobleman of equal Fortunes, and are follow'd by Attempts upon one another, may be conniv'd at when they are reconcil'd; but if the thing be between a Nobleman of the Better sort, and one of the Lesser, let it be chastis'd with some appearance of Severity at least, for fear the Humours of the small Nobility should be stirr'd; But if one of these shall attack a Nobleman of the First Rate, let him be punish'd with a heavy hand, lest the Party injur'd, being potent in Friends, go

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about to do himself Justice, to the great detriment of the Publick Authority: But if a Nobleman do commit an Enormity towards a Subject, first let there be all the endeavour possible used to justifie him; and if that cannot be, let the punishment be with more Noise than Harm; But if a Subject insults a Nobleman, let the Revenge be sharp and publick, that the Subjects may not accustom themselves to lay hands upon the Nobility, but rather think them Venerable and Sacred.

In Civil Judicatures it would be requisite to act without Passion, to take away that ill Opinion that Men have of the Partiality of Justice, in favour of the Great. This Belief must be destroyed; for a Subject that once thinks himself prejudg'd by the Quality of his Adversary, will never be capable of seeing whether his Cause has been decided according to the merit

rit of it or no: Therefore there can never be too much diligence uſed in the Adminiſtration of Civil Judicatures, which are one of the greateſt Foundations of Government; for when a Subject can ſay to himſelf, That he ſhall have Juſtice, if his Caſe deſerves it, he ſubmits to a great many other Grievances without repining: And on the contrary, though after an unjuſt Sentence, he ſhould be indulg'd in ſome Criminal Matter, he will never have a Love for the Government, becauſe the Injury receiv'd, will ſtick in his Memory, and the Indulgence will vaniſh out of it.

The Quarrels between the *Plebeians* may be judged according to the common courſe of Juſtice, which may there appear in its Natural Being, there ariſing no Politick Grounds to diſturb the Courſe of it; nay, rather their little Animoſities are to be fomented,

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as *Cato* us'd to do in his Family; and for this Reaſon, wiſe Antiquity permitted the Encounters and Battles that are ſtill practis'd in this City, between ſeveral Parties of the People; But all Aſſemblies of numerous Bodies are to be avoided as the Plague, becauſe nothing can ſooner overturn the *Commonwealth*, than the Facility the People may meet with in getting together to confer or debate about their Grievances; Nay, this thing is ſo dangerous, that it is to be deteſted and abhorr'd, even in the *Nobility*, becauſe that there being in all Bodies ſome ill Humours, if they are not united, either they do not work at all, or do not work ill; But if they once are in a Maſs, and take their courſe one way, they not only are hard to cure, but often prove mortal to the Body. Let there be a careful watch upon all Seditious Diſcourſes, nay, upon all Speculative ones that ſeem any way

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to censure the Government; and set before your Eyes the Example of Heresies, which have never so much wasted the Church as when they have had their Beginnings from Curiosity and Jests.

Let the City *Arsenal* be kept up, though there be not present occasion for it, because things that depend upon Time, must be anticipated by time. Let the Masters and Tradesmen of the place be kept satisfied, and upon any Fault committed, let the Punishment be Paternal; that is, with seeming Rigour, but not such as to make them run away; for, if possible, they are to believe the Fable of the Mouse, who thought its hole to be all the World.

Let the Publick Secretaries, and all other Officers that must be inform'd of the Publick Concerns, be chosen with care, as like to be faithful and diligent; but when once admitted, though they should prove

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otherwiſe, let them be born withal, becauſe there is need of but a few to do well: But every ſingle Officer can do hurt; and it's much eaſier to defend ones ſelf from a Potent Foreign Enemy, than from an ill-meaning Servant.

Let the Manufactures which are peculiar to *Venice*, be preſerv'd; and to that end let them not be loaded with many Impoſitions, becauſe that Profit and Gain which has made Men venture through a Thouſand Difficulties, to diſcover New Worlds, will ſtill carry the Merchant, if he cannot have it at home, to ſeek it abroad, though he go to the *Antipodes* for it. Preſerve the Artiſts therefore, remembring that moſt Arts are a kind of Phantaſtick Being.

The Marriages between Noblemen and Women of the City, may be tolerated, if the Women are very rich; becauſe it often happens that the Induſtry of many Years

of

of the *Plebeians*, ſerves only to enrich the Houſe of a Nobleman; and it is a gentle Imperceptible ſort of Uſurpation; 'tis true, 'tis ſomething abating of the Luſtre of the Noble Families; but that is only in abſtract and in general, but in reality it advantages the Nobility; and there need be no fear that the Children be degenerate and baſe, becauſe nothing ſo debaſes a Nobleman as Poverty: Beſides, there reſults from this another great advantage, which is, to make the *Plebeians* concern'd by Affection for the Nobility, and bound to ſtudy their advantage by a much ſweeter tye than that of Obedience.

Let the Conſiderable Honours of the Commonwealth be diſpoſed of to thoſe who may naturally pretend to them, for having gone through the many Employments, which are ſteps to the higheſt Dignities, making always an allowance for extraordinary Merit, in which the

the State can never be too prodigal: For otherwiſe to prefer thoſe who cannot reckon themſelves among the Lawful Pretenders, gives juſt Offence to the others his Equals, and likewiſe ſtrengthens the pretenſions of the unworthy, who not ſeeing any thing in that Fortunate Man that exceeds their ordinary Talent, cannot imagine why he ſhould be preferr'd, and they excluded from the like Dignities. The Subject on the other hand is hardly brought to pay Exceſſive Reverence where they never us'd to give but ordinary Reſpect; and from this argues, That the Dignity it ſelf is not of ſo much value, ſince it is beſtowed upon ſo inconſiderable a Perſon.

And becauſe it is in the Nature of all ſublunary things to have a mixture of Imperfection, I muſt own, that the Republick of *Venice* has likewiſe its Defects; and the Chief one is, That the Body of the No-

Nobility is too numerous to be *Ariſtocratical*; therefore it will always be expedient to contrive, by all Arts imaginable, that the Great Council do delegate the greateſt Authority that may be to the Senate and the Council of *Ten*: But this muſt be done by ſecret imperceptible ways, ſuch as ſhall not be diſcover'd till after 'tis done, becauſe when they have once for all parted with their power, it will be a happy ſettlement of the deliberating part, and if the ſame can be compoſed in the Judiciary and diſtributive Power, it may be hop'd, that the Conſtitution of the State will be more vigorous: It cannot be denied but the Great Council does reliſh very much of the *Mobile*, and by conſequent, ſubject to impetuous Deliberations, not always weigh'd in the Ballance of Prudence and Experience. And truly I admire, that wiſe Antiquity did not gain this Point, it being eaſie

easie for them to take advantage of the simplicity of their times; or at least to have prolong'd the time of the great Magistratures further than from Year to Year, at the end of which they now must have a new Confirmation from the Senate; For this being design'd to prevent the falling into the Tyranny of the great ones, does unawares run the State into that of the meaner sort, so much the more odious by how much 'tis more numerous and unexperienc'd; We should see more vigorous Resolutions in the Senators, if they were not continually obliged to court the Favour of the *Piazza*.

The Office of *Avogadore* is to be disposed of with extream Circumspection, and that to Persons of Eminency, such as have no need of fawning upon the Multitude of the Great Council, and then the Senate and Council of *Ten* might make some steps beyond their Natural

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Authority, which would be born with patience, and Time would give them Preſcription: Whereas, if an *Avogadore*, to make himſelf Popular, ſhall carry theſe Deliberations to the Great Councils Cenſure, immediately out of Jealouſie they are annull'd, though never ſo expedient. Therefore if that Office of *Avogadore* cannot be placed in the hands of one who inclines more to the *Patritian* than to the *Popular* ſide, it would be well to give it to one of mean Spirit, and a quiet Temper; or if it be diſpoſed of to an unquiet bold man, let him be one who lies under ſome infamous imputation of Corruption, or other Enormity, to the end that the firſt may not be able, nor the latter dare to affront, and try it with the Grandees of the State; Otherwiſe an *Avogadore* of Parts, Integrity and Malignity, may eaſily ſet fire to the Four Corners of the Commonwealth.

For

For the ſame Reaſons it will always be well to leſſen the Authority of the *Quaranties*, they being naturally popular. They were conſtituted numerous, to prevent the Venality of Juſtice; but on the other hand they are ſubject to gather peccant Humours, and afford too much nouriſhment to a Feveriſh Temper: They may be born with in the adminiſtration of Civil Juſtice, but in Criminals their power ſhould be leſſen'd, which may be done by the Council of *Ten*'s taking to their Cognizance all Criminal Caſes that they can any ways draw to them, and by leaving off the Cuſtom of deligating the Power of the Senate and *Signoria* to theſe *Quaranties*, as is now practis'd but too often. If theſe *Quaranties* were quite taken away, it would be better for the Government, but then it would be as neceſſary to provide ſome other way for ſo many neceſſitous and idle perſons.

It

It were well to uſe all means to take from them the Authority of judging Noblemen in Criminal Caſes; for ſo by degrees they will loſe many of the Priviledges affected to the Nobility, as alſo I could wiſh they were totally excluded from the Senate; But that is more to be wiſh'd than hop'd for.

As for the People, let them always be provided for by plenty of things for ſuſtenance, and as cheap as may be: For the Nature of the Rabble is ſo malicious, that even when ſcarcity of Proviſions comes from the failing of the Crops, they nevertheleſs impute it to the Malice or Negligence of the Great ones: So there is no way to make them hold their peace, but to ſtop their Mouths. Employ as many of the People as may be in the Service of the Publick, that ſo drawing their Livelyhood from the Government, they may have affection for it, and the Numbers of the Neceſſitous will

will thereby be leſſen'd: for if Hunger and Want can make ſtrong Towns yield, it will likewiſe incite Men to venture their Lives in deſperate Attempts, rather than linger in miſery. Yet ſtill I would not adviſe to take any into Office that had not firſt gain'd wherewithal to ſubſiſt in a mediocrity; for elſe it will be but giving him a kind of leave to cheat, to the great damage of the Publick.

As for the Married Women of the City, let there be care taken to keep them honeſt; and to have them ſo, they muſt be kept retir'd, remembring, that the Beginnings of all Corruption in that kind are ſlight, and proceed from a Look or a Salute.

Let one Modern Abuſe be reform'd, which is, that the Noblemen do take upon them to force the People to make Agreements, Payments, or Marriages, and not dare to have recourſe to the Publick Au-

Authority, upon which this is an Uſurpation: If this be not remedied, 'tis enough to cauſe another *Sicilian Veſpers*: Beſides, that it is likely to ſet all the Nobility together by the Ears, while each will maintain his own Friends and Dependants.

In all Occurrences where the Publick Faith is engaged, let it be inviolably kept, without minding any preſent advantage that might accrew by the breaking of it; for that is but momentaneous: whereas the Benefit of keeping Faith is eternal; and a Prince that breaks his Word, muſt invent a new Religion to make himſelf be believed another time, ſeeing the Oaths he made in the Religion he profeſſes have not been able to bind him.

Let the Nobles forbear all Trading; for a State that will have Merchants, muſt not have their Governours exerciſe that Profeſſion,

on, becauſe the Merchants will always be afraid of being Brow-beaten in Bargains, and over-aw'd in their Dealings. The *Spaniards*, who have ſo little kindneſs for the *Venetian* Government, have not a more odious Name than to call it, *A Republick of Merchants*. By an Ancient Law, a Nobleman tax'd with Trading, cannot enter into a Turnament, as not being fit Company for *Cavaliers*. Merchandiſe may in a ſhort time either extreamly enrich, or totally ruine a Family, both which are dangerous for the Commonwealth. Beſides, a Merchant is of a neceſſity in ſome meaſure a Foreigner, while his Trade and Intereſt lies abroad, and a Nobleman ought to have no Intereſt nor Affection but at home. If Politicians have taught, that it is not ſafe for a great City to have too ſumptuous Palaces and Villas in its Territory, leſt the fear of loſing of them ſhould incline them to

yield the very City to a potent Enemy: What ſhall we ſay of thoſe Nobles, who, being engag'd in Trade, may have many Thouſands of Crowns in an Enemies Country? In the beginnings of a Commonwealth, Merchandiſing was neceſſary to get out of Poverty, and now 'tis dangerous, as being the Fomenter of too much Luxury. The *Genoueſes* who have continued the Trading of their Nobility, have but ſmall Reſpect ſhew'd them by other Princes, and are more valued one by one than altogether.

Let ſuperfluous Pomps be forbidden, though if they were only followed by the Rich, it would be of uſe to the Government, becauſe it would bleed thoſe who are too ſanguine; but by reaſon of the Emulation which is between thoſe of the ſame Degree, the permitting of them would prove ruinous to many Families, who could neither avoid

void them, nor go through with them: And whoever by a Punctilio of Honour is brought to the neceſſity of doing more than he is able, muſt uſe, to compaſs it, ſuch means as he ought not to employ.

Before a Law be made and promulgated, let it be well thought on and debated: but being once made, let it be obſerved, and the *non*-obſervance of it puniſhed; becauſe whoever ſuffers Diſobedience in ſmall matters, teaches it in greater: And that Nobleman who thinks to diſtinguiſh himſelf by ſlighting of the Laws, offends both his Country and himſelf by ſuch an Example, more than by any diſſoluteneſs he could be guilty of, becauſe he directly ſtrikes at the Publick Authority; and beſides, ſuch a Cuſtom once taking Root in a Commonwealth, and being an inveterate Abuſe among the Nobility, it is not to be reform'd with leſs than the loſs of the Lives of half the Body.

If there be an occaſion of coming to ſome Reſolution that may be thought unpleaſing to the generality, particularly in point of Juſtice, let it be given out, That it was carried by a thin Majority, that at leaſt they who were againſt it, may pleaſe themſelves in thinking they had many of their Opinion.

Let the Secrets of the Government be kept inviolably, and do not forget that Ancient Record of the *Venetian Circumſpection*, which was, That when the general *Carmagnuola* was condemned, the Reſolution (though taken by Three Hundred and Fifteen Senators) never took Air for Eight Months together before the Execution; which is a thing that the moſt abſolute Princes could not have met with in the Fidelity of Three or Four State-Miniſters, though bound by exceſſive Rewards to Secreſy. And what a wonderful thing was the depoſition

of

of the *Doge Foſcari*, conceal'd by his own Brother? Certainly one cannot without Tears obſerve, that in our Times ſo great a Quality which ſeem'd to be proper to the *Venetian* Commonwealth, is ſomething altered by the inconſideration of the young Nobility, who, not out of Diſloyalty, but too much Freedom, do let things ſlip from them which ought to be conceal'd. I think every *Venetian* Nobleman ought to teach his Children the uſe of Secreſie with their Catechiſm; but the better way were to forbid all talking of Publick Concerns out of the place where they are properly to be deliberated on, and much leſs among thoſe who are partakers of the Secret.

Let the Honours and Dignities of the Commonwealth be diſpenſed regularly, and by degrees, avoiding all ſudden Flights, becauſe they are dangerous: To ſee a Cloud enlighten'd of a ſudden, is moſt com-

monly a ſign of a Thunderbolt to come out of it; and he that from a private man leaps in an inſtant to the Port of a Prince, has ſomething of the Player. Honours given by degrees keep the young Nobility from attaining them before they are ripe for them; and we may obſerve, that as in Phyſick a man moderately Learned, but well Experienc'd, is ſafer for the health of the Body Natural; So in the Government of the Commonwealth, a man often employed, though, perhaps of leſs acuteneſs, ſucceeds beſt. All Matters of Benefices are very properly under the Cognizance of the Great Council, but it would be as proper to take away all Appeals to the *Quaranties*, and place them in the Senate, becauſe it often happens, that theſe Cauſes are to be decided according to reaſon of State; and thoſe *Quarantia Judges* put little value upon thoſe Politick Reaſons: And beſides, it

ſeems

ſeems a great incongruity, that a Sentence, where the Perſon of the *Doge*, and the whole *Signoria*, both intervene, ſhould afterwards be lyable to the Cenſure of Forty Perſons of leſſer value. I believe if it were obſerved to chaſtiſe rigorouſly, but ſecretly all thoſe Lawyers and their Clients, who carry theſe Appeals to the *Quarantias*, the uſe of them would be leſs frequent, and in time they would be forborn, as if they were forbidden.

If it ſhould fall out, that any of your Subjects ſhould procure a Decree in the *Rota*, or Court of *Rome*, you muſt rigorouſly command from him a Renunciation *ab Impetratis*, elſe all beneficiary Cauſes will be devolv'd to *Rome*, where they are look'd upon as Sacred, and ſo a fourth part of all Civil Cauſes would be loſt for your own Courts: Auditors of the *Rota* are to be with the Commonwealth, like Biſhops *in partibus Infidelium*, a thing of

Title, but without Subjects.

Let the Biſhops of the *Venetian* State be always præcogniz'd in the Conſiſtory by a *Venetian Cardinal*, without the Circumſtance of creating him Special Procurator; but as Protector, which he really ought to be as other *Cardinals* brag they are ſo, for other States. For the Court of *Rome*, to avoid theſe procurations to *Venetian* Cardinals, would perhaps deſiſt making any of that Nation, that ſo they might oblige the State to have recourſe to Strangers, which in time would alſo prejudice the pretence of being treated as *Crown'd Heads*. If the preconiſation be made otherwiſe, let the State ſeize the Temporalities of the Biſhoprick, and ſtop all Penſions laid upon it: 'Tis true, that if the Cardinal *Nipote* ſhould make the Preconiſation, and enjoy at the ſame time the priviledge of a *Venetian* Nobleman, it could not well be rejected.

If

If it ſhould ever happen that there ſhould be a *Pope*, I won't ſay a *Venetian*, for that would be of more danger than advantage to the Government, but a Foreigner well inclin'd to the *Venetian* Republick, then would be the time to obtain once for all the Grant of the *Tenths* upon the Clergy, as once it was got under *Clement* the Sixth, whoſe Bull is unfortunately loſt; for 'tis troubleſome to get it renew'd every Five Year or Seven Year; and it would be a Point gain'd which ſtill would more and more equal the Republick with Crown'd Heads; as alſo if in the Titles given by the *Pope* to the *Doge*, there could be gain'd the Superlative, as *Cariſſimo* or *Dilectiſſimo*, as is uſual to Crown'd Heads, it would be a new luſtre to the Republick, which for want of theſe things, and alſo becauſe that never any *Venetian Nuncio* was promoted to be Cardinal, is look'd upon at

Rome as a kind of Third Power between Crown'd Heads and the Ducal State. If, I ſay, all this could be gain'd by the State from a *Pope*, there might be ſome return made, by making a Law, That Churchmen in Criminals ſhould not be judged by any Tribunal but the Council of *Ten*, or Delegates from that Council. And now I am ſpeaking of that Council, I cannot but inculcate, That all means poſſible ſhould be uſed to hinder an *Avogadore* from daring to carry the Decrees of the Council of *Ten* to be re-view'd or cenſur'd by any other Council: but rather, if there ought to be any Change made in them, let it be by the ſame Power that made them; otherwiſe the Conſequence will be a conſtant annihilation of their Decrees, and a manifeſt depreſſion of the great Nobility, with an Exaltation of the leſſer.

Touching the Authority of this Council, I have this more to ſay,

That

That I could wish, that the Delegations of its Power were less frequent, with great regard to the Dignity of the Persons, as well as to the Splendor of the Government, which is always more reverenced when it is least communicated, like the Sun-beams, which in that glorious Body are of Gold, but communicated to the Moon, are but of Silver. Indeed our Ancestors would have deserved well of us, if they had lengthened the time of this Magistracy: but because that which was not done in those Old Times, can hardly be hop'd for in these Modern ones, the only Remedy would be to obtain a Continuation of the same persons for another year, under pretext of avoiding so many various Elections in so short a time as must be made by a Scrutiny in the *Pregadi*: 'Tis true, that would exempt the persons continued from the Governments of Expence; but as long as that Exemption

tion did not extend beyond a year, there would be little Inconvenience in it: And if it be objected, That this would too much ſtrengthen the Authority of the great ones, I anſwer, That it laſting but a few months, could not be of ill Conſequence: and on the other ſide, thoſe hands are, as it were, tied up, which ought to be at liberty to do Juſtice, while every week they may be canvaſs'd and teas'd by a Party of mean Perſons, both for the Conditions of their Mind and Fortune: I have often admired how the Council of *Ten* (having already all the Criminal Power, and a good part of the Judiciary in Civil Cauſes, as well as in State-Affairs) have ſuffered themſelves to be thus fetter'd, it ſeeming to me almoſt impoſſible that the Inferiour ſort ſhould at the time of this Modification have ſo far prevail'd over the middling Nobility, as to make them forget, that it is much

better

better obeying a few Great Ones, than a Multitude of Inferiours. The Prudence of the Great Ones must be awak'd, to take all secret advantage to repair these past Omissions by means not easily penetrated.

Let Vertue be esteem'd where-ever it is; and if it be Eminent in one who is not Noble, let it find a Regard; for he has made himself Noble; and all Hereditary Nobility has had its beginning from some personal Eminency. And thus much for the First Head.

The Second Head, which is concerning the Government of your Subjects, may be divided into those who confine upon the Sea, and in your Islands, and those of *Terra Firma*.

As to the first, there needs not much Speculation; for they confining only upon the *Turk*, and there be-

being among them but few Persons of Note or Riches, there remains nothing but to shew your selves just by giving them good Rulers; and there you ought to be very careful: for if they have Justice and Plenty, they will never think of changing their Masters: Those few of *Istria* and *Dalmatia*, that confine upon the Emperour, have not in themselves any Qualities to waken your Jealousie, and are besides well affectioned to the Government of the Republick.

For your *Greek* Subjects of the Island of *Candia*, and the other Islands of the *Levant*, there is no doubt but there is some greater regard to be had of them, first, because that the *Greek* Faith is never to be trusted; and perhaps they would not much stick at submitting to the *Turk*, having the Example of all the rest of their Nation before their Eyes: These therefore must be watch'd with more attenti-

on,

on, leſt, like Wild Beaſts, as they are, they ſhould find an occaſion to uſe their Teeth and Claws; the ſureſt way is to keep good Garriſons to awe them, and not uſe them to Arms or Muſters, in hopes of being aſſiſted by them in an Extremity: for they will always ſhew ill Inclinations proportionably to the Strength they ſhall be Maſters of, they being of the Nature of the Gally-Slaves, who, if they were well us'd, would return the kindneſs, by ſeizing the Gally, and carry it and its Commander to *Algiers*: Wine and Baſtonadoes ought to be their Share, and keep Good Nature for a better occaſion.

As for the Gentlemen of thoſe Collonies, you muſt be very watchful of them; for beſides the Natural Ferocity of the Climate, they have the Character of *Noblemen*, which raiſes their Spirits, as the frequent Rebellions of *Candia* do

do ſufficiently evidence. The uſe of Colonies was advantageous to the *Roman* Commonwealth, becauſe they preſerv'd even in *Aſia* and *Africa*, *Roman* Inclinations, and with them a kindneſs for their Country. If the Gentlemen of theſe Colonies do tyrannize over the Villages of their Dominion, the beſt way is not to ſeem to ſee it, that there may be no kindneſs between them and their Subjects; but if they offend in any thing elſe, 'twill be well to chaſtiſe them ſeverely, that they may not brag of any Priviledges more than others: It will not be amiſs likewiſe to diſpute all their Pretenſions to any particular Juriſdiction; and if at any time their Nobility or Title be diſputed, it will do well to ſell them the Confirmation of it at as dear a Rate as poſſible: and, in a word, remember that all the Good that can come from them, is already obtain'd, which was to fix the *Ve-*

netian

netian Dominion; and for the future there is nothing but Miſchief to be expected from them.

As for the Subjects of *Terra Firma*, there is required a more abſtruſe way of governing, by diſtinguiſhing thoſe who by an ancient Inclination are well affected to the Republick, as thoſe of *Breſcia*, *Crema*, and *Bergamo*, and alſo thoſe of *Vicenza*; for to them there ought to be ſuitable returns of kindneſs made upon occaſion to the others, who only have a kindneſs of Obedience, ſuch as are the *Veroneſes*, *Padouans* and *Trevigians*, it will be good to make ſhew of great Juſtice towards them, but not let ſlip any occaſion of keeping them low: It is good to wink at the Fewds and Enmities that happen among them, for from theſe two benefits ariſe to the Commonwealth, to wit, Private Diſcord among themſelves, and good Confiſcations to the Publick.

Let

Let all Extortions and Oppreſſions committed by the Gentry upon the People, be ſeverely puniſhed, that the People may be affectionate to the Government, as being particularly protected by it: In all occaſions of Taxes and Impoſitions, ſuffer not any Remonſtrances, remembring how in 1606. there had like to have been a League between the *Breſcian* and *Veroneze*, in order to obtain an Abolition of Impoſts, and with what boldneſs the *Breſcian* Embaſſadours made their Complaints in the Senate: It was a very previous Diſpoſition to a Rebellion; Therefore it will be fit to let them know, That if the State think good to lay a Tax, there is no way of avoiding it. Thoſe who in the Councils of theſe Towns, are of a reſolute Nature, and ſomewhat refractory to the Orders of the State, you muſt either ruin or oblige, even at the Publick Charge: For a ſmall Leven is enough

nough to ferment a great Mass of Bread.

The *Brescians* have a Priviledge which you must infringe upon all fit opportunities, which is, *That no Estates of* Brescians *can be bought but by* Brescians *themselves:* For if the *Venetians* could extend themselves in that most fertile Country, in a few years it would be as it is now with the *Padouans*, who have scarce a Third of their own Country left them. In the Case of a Rich Heiress, it will be well to endeavour, by all fair means, to marry her with some of the *Venetian* Nobility, to enrich them, and impoverish the others. Let their Governours be chosen among those of the highest Spirits of the *Venetian* Nobility, that they may in them venerate the Prince: for every man naturally gives more Credit to his Eyes than to his Ears. Observe however this Caution in Taxing, That you do not thereby

thereby hinder Plenty: For though men may be perſwaded to part with Superfluities, yet not with what is neceſſary for Life. As for Employments, if there be room, omit not to give them to the Natives, but ſtill in places remote from their own Dwelling, and keep them there as long as may be, that they may loſe their Intereſt at home. If there be Heads of Factions among them, they muſt be Exterminated any way; but if you have them in Priſon, 'tis better to uſe Poyſon than the Hangman, becauſe the advantage will be the ſame, and the *odium* leſs. You muſt have an Account of the Taxes that their Neighbours the *Milaneſes* undergo, and ſtill let thoſe of the *Venetian* Subjects be ſomething lighter in compariſon; and moreover let them be free from quartering of Souldiers, which is in it ſelf the heavieſt of all Tyrannical Oppreſſions.

Let

Let the great Crimes be ſtill brought before the Council of *Ten*, that the Veneration for the Power at diſtance may be greater, and likewiſe becauſe the Miniſters of Juſtice will be leſs ſubject to be corrupted, when the Criminals are in the Priſons of the State. Let the Proceſs againſt them be tedious, that ſo the *ſlowneſs* of proceedings may be ſome part of puniſhment: But for the *Banditi*, if they dare to appear in the State, let them be Extermined with all Induſtry; for there cannot be a greater Demonſtration of Contempt in the Subject, and Weakneſs of the Prince, than for a Condemned Man to dare to come into the Dominions out of which he has been baniſhed, as if one ſhould frequent another man's Houſe in ſpight of his Teeth. The Biſhopricks and other Church-Preferments may be conferr'd upon the Natives, firſt, to avoid the Imputation

putation of too much *Avarice* in the *Venetian* Nobility, if they ſhould take all Preferments to themſelves. *Secondly*, In order to debaſe the Spirits of the Natives, and turn them off from Arms to an idle Life: Beſides, it will be a kind of a Shadow of Liberty, to make them bear their Subjection the better. But as much as it may be convenient to let them attain the Degree of Biſhops, ſo much would it be dangerous to let them arrive to that of Cardinal; for then they will be ſure to abhor the Quality of Subjects, ſince thoſe who wear that Purple have uſurp'd the Precedency even over Princes.

Let every City have the making of their own Gentry by their Common-Council; for that will make it ſo much the meaner; but ſtill let them be bound to have the Confirmation from the Senate.

Let

Let all thoſe Families who apply themſelves to the Service of Foreign Princes, be upon all occaſions ſlighted, and not at all countenanced by the Government, intimating to them by that ſilent notice, That he deſerves little of his own Prince who ſeeks Employment with a Foreign one: And if any of theſe who have ſerv'd abroad, ſhould be ſo bold, as to contend with a *Venetian* Nobleman, if it be at *Venice*, let the Puniſhment be ſevere, if he be in the wrong; but if it is in his own Country, let it be gentle, that the Opinion of the Publick Juſtice may be advantageouſly inſinuated to the People; and likewiſe, that the Noble *Venetians* themſelves may avoid Conteſts, where they are not more immediately protected.

Let the Citadels of the Chief Cities be well provided, as much againſt a Foreign Enemy, as to chaſtiſe a Rebellion at home, nothing

thing so much inclining to offend, as the hopes of Impunity: and it may indeed be said, That if Men were certain of a punishment to follow, they would never offend at all; but a Prince that is sufficiently provided, is sufficiently safe. Remember, that as it is very hard to find either a Wife or a Monk, that one time or another have not repented the loss of their Natural Liberty, so the same may be said of Subjects, who fancy that they have parted with more of that they were born to than was necessary for their well-being. And let this suffice for the Second Head.

Coming now to those several Princes with whom the *Venetian* Republick may have Concerns, we will begin with the *Pope*, as being the first in Dignity, if not in Power.

And

And here we must have a Two-fold Consideration, he being to be look'd upon as a Spiritual and as a Temporal Prince. There has been some Advertisements given already about his Spiritual Power: We will add here what was then omitted:

First, We must admire the wonderful State of that Monarchy, which from a mean and persecuted Condition, for the *Series* of many years, in which the very Exercise of Religion was punished with Death, is arriv'd to so much Greatness, that all Regal Dignities of the same Communion, pay Homage to this Spiritual Monarch, by the kissing of his Feet. God Almighty has been pleased this way to shew the Reward of Christian Religion, by raising to the Supreamest Greatness the Institutors and Ministers of it; but the Piety of Christian Princes has very much

tributed to it; and the first was *Constantine*: This Emperor not only embrac'd the Christian Faith, but enrich'd the Church extreamly, and since his time several other Emperors and Kings have, as it were, vied with one another, who should give most: But that which is most inscrutable is, how with their Riches they came to give away also their Jurisdiction and Power.

For six hundred years after the coming of Christ the Popes were always confirmed by the Emperors, or in their steads, by the *Exarcks* of *Ravenna*; and in the very Patent of Confirmation there was always written these Words, *Regnante Tali Domino Nostro.* In the year 518. the Emperor *Justinus* sent from *Constantinople* his Embassadors to Pope *Hormisda*, to confirm the Authority of the Apostolical Sea, and to announce Peace to the Church. In 684. *Constantine* the Se-

Second gave to *Benedictus* the Second a Conceſſion, by which, for the future, the Election of Popes ſhould be made by the Clergy and People of *Rome*, and ſhould not need the Confirmation of the Emperour, nor of the *Exarck*, not reflecting, that the holineſs of thoſe times might come to change it ſelf into an Intereſt of State. *Bonifacius* the Third obtained of the Emperour *Phocas*, that all other Chriſtian Churches might be obedient to the *Roman*. After this, in the year 708. *Juſtinus* the Second was the firſt that ſubmitted to kiſs the Pope's Feet; and that Pope's Name was *Conſtantine*: But *Adrian* the firſt having received great Favours from *Charles* the firſt, King of *France*, did in a Council of One Hundred and Fifty Three Biſhops, confer upon him the Authority of chuſing the Popes, which was about the year 773. a Priviledge which his Son *Lewis the Pious* knew not

how to keep, but parted with it for the imaginary Title of *Pious*; to which might be added that of *Simple*. Howſoever ſcandalous the Emperours were in their Lives, the Popes did uſe to bear with them, referring to God Almighty the puniſhment of them: But in the year 713. *Philip*, Emperour of *Conſtantinople*, being fallen into Hereſy, was Excommunicated by Pope *Conſtantine*, and had the Reward due for all the Honours and Priviledges given by his Predeceſſors to the Popes. This was the very firſt time that the Imperial Power was forc'd to ſtoop to the Papal; and yet at the ſame time the Church of *Milan* claim'd an Independency from the *Roman*, and maintain'd it for above Two Hundred Years, being countenanc'd by the Emperours, who often came into *Italy*, and in their abſence by the *Exarchs* of *Ravenna*, till at laſt, in the year 1057. it yielded up the Conteſt to Pope *Stephen*

the Ninth. In the year 1143. *Celeſtin* the Second was the firſt Pope choſen by Cardinals in Excluſion to the People.

I have made this Narration, that it may appear by what Degrees this Spiritual Monarchy has increaſed; and in it, the Goodneſs of Chriſtian Princes is not more to be admired than the Dexterity of the Popes, in not omitting any occaſion to gain ground.

At preſent the Emperour is choſen by a Pontifical Bull, where the Power of Election is committed to the Three Eccleſiaſtical, and Four Secular Electors, with an Obligation nevertheleſs in the Emperour choſen, to receive his Confirmation and Coronation from the Pope; ſo that the Subject is at laſt become Prince over his own Prince, not without ſome reflection of Weakneſs upon *Otho* the Fourth, Emperour of *Germany*, who in the year 994. agreed with Pope *Gregory* to

ſettle the Election in this manner, for the Honour (as he thought) of the *German* Nation, but with great Diminution of the Imperial Dignity. To this Grandeur of the Papacy, if we add that of having ſubjected to its power all the other Biſhops of *Chriſtendom*, and obtain'd to be own'd the firſt of all the Patriarchs, who long conteſted its Primacy. I ſay, ſo high a Power ought to make all other well-govern'd States very wary in their proceedings with it, and to have a careful Eye upon all thoſe occaſions wherein the pontifical Authority may be ſtill enlarged, becauſe 'tis obſerved, that all Courteſies and Favours of Princes are in that Court turn'd to Debts and Claims in the ſpace of a few years; and to obtain the poſſeſſion, they do not ſpare for *Exorciſms* and *Anathema's*.

There is one Cuſtom, or rather Abuſe introduc'd in that Court, which

which deſerves great conſideration from Princes, which is the power the *Pope* has aſſum'd of depoſing Princes and Soveraigns, and giving their Kingdoms and States to others, under pretext of ill Government. The Prodigal Son in the Goſpel did not loſe his Right to his portion, though he was reſolv'd to diſſipate and conſume it viciouſly, becauſe that Title which we receive from Nature can never be loſt in our whole Life. The Kings of *Navar* were fain to go *Vagabonds* about the World for the ſake of a Bit of Parchment which *Pope Julius* the Second put out againſt them, whereby King *John* the Second loſt his Kingdom, which was given to *Ferdinand* of *Arragon*; and had not providence brought them to the Crown of *France*, there would have been no mention in the World of the Kings of *Navar*.

From this Liberty of taking away Kingdoms, the *Popes* assume that of Erecting them. Pope *Paul* the Fourth made *Ireland* a Kingdom, and *Pius* the Fifth Erected *Tuscany* into a great Dutchy. Queen *Elizabeth* of *England*, was deposed by *Paul* the Third, and according to the usual custom, her Kingdom given to *Philip* the Second of *Spain*, who was to execute the Papal Sentence; but he met with the Winds and Seas, and the *English* Ships, which quite defeated his *Armada*. In *France*, by a priviledge of the *Gallican* Church, they admit of no Bulls that contain Deprivation of Kings, but keep to the Right of Succession: and indeed to depose an actual King, and give away his Kingdom, is not only to destroy a suppos'd Delinquent, but to punish an Innocent Successour, and likewise to prejudice the Right of Election in those who have it.

On

On the other hand *England* has often thought fit to make it self Tributary to the See of *Rome* by the *Peter-Pence*, the first time under Pope *Leo* the Fourth, and more remarkably under *King John*, in 1214. to avoid the Invasion from *France*; but *Henry* the Eighth delivered himself once for all, and not only refused the Tribute, but made himself amends by seizing the Church-Lands. The fresh Example of *Paul* the Fifth towards this Republick is never to be forgot, who charitably would have govern'd another bodies House, under pretext that the Master did not understand how to do it himself: And the constancy of the *Venetian* Republick will have given fair warning to the Court of *Rome*, how they undertake such Quarrels, since they were forced to come to an agreement with very little satisfaction or Honour on their side, having been obliged ta-

citely to give up their claim; for to demand peremptorily, and then relinquish the Demand, is a sign it was not well founded in Justice; and the Absolution refus'd, was proof enough, that the Excommunication was void in it self: So that the advantage that has accrew'd to the *Venetian* Government from the Contest, has been much greater than the damage sustain'd in it.

If ever for the future, which I scarce believe, there should happen an occasion of an Interdict from the Court of *Rome* to the Republick, I should advise presently to post up in *Rome* an Appellation to the future Council, which is a cruel blow to them: For first, it insinuates the Superiority of the Council over the *Pope*; and secondly, it revives the memory of Councils, and lets them see they are not things quite forgot all the World over. If there be

care

care taken to examine well all Bulls that come from *Rome*, and the Obſervation of what has been hitherto practis'd, be ſtrictly continued, it may be hop'd, that the Republick ſhall not undergo any greater Subjection than other Princes, but rather ſhall have ſome Liberty above them, particularly more than the *Spaniards*, who find their account in complying with the Tyranny of *Rome*, becauſe they receive at the ſame time great Favours from it, and are proud of maintaining its Authority. To ſay truth, the *Popes* hitherto have ſhew'd little kindneſs to the Republick, and except the Priviledges granted by *Alexander* the Third, which ſerve more to regiſter to the World the Action of the Republick, in reſtoring and protecting him, than for any thing elſe; For the *Doge* might of himſelf without the Papal Conceſſion, have aſſum'd thoſe other little Ornaments

naments of the *Ombrella*, the Standard and the Sword: So that bating the Conceſſions of the *Decimes* upon the Clergy, and the Nominations to the Biſhopricks, this Country of ours feels but ſlender Effects of the Pontifical Kindneſs, which may be an advantage upon all Occurrences of Intereſt of State to ſtick the cloſer to that, becauſe there needs no Complements where every one deſires but his own.

In conſidering the Secular Power of the *Pope*, we will do it upon Five Heads, which may ſerve to examine all other Princes Intereſts with the Republick.

Firſt, *If it be advantageous to the Republick to have the Church grow greater.*

Secondly, *What Title, Inclination or Facility the Popes may have to acquire any part of the State of the Republick.*

Thirdly,

Thirdly, *What Inclination, Title or Facility the Republick may have to acquire any part of the State of the Church.*

Fourthly, *If the Church may unite with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Princes.*

Fifthly, *If the Church can unite with other Princes, to hinder the progreſs of the Arme of the Republick.*

To begin with the Firſt, we will anſwer with a General Rule, which is, That it never is advantageous to a Prince, who deſires to remain free and powerful, to let another grow great, except it be to leſſen a Third, who is greater than them both; and if he that is thus agrandiz'd be a Neighbour, his advancement is ſo much more to be feared: Theſe Alterations indeed may not be ſo dangerous to a little Prince, who does not fear depending upon a great one, to avoid

void being moleſted by one who is already too ſtrong for him.

But to come cloſer to the Caſe of the Republick, we will ſay, That if the Church could make it ſelf Maſter of any part of the King of *Spain*'s Dominions in *Italy*, where he is the greateſt Prince, they might hope for the conſent of the Republick, which is the Second Great *Italian* Potentate, becauſe by that means the Republick might become the Firſt; and however, the ſtrength of the Church will always give leſs jealouſie to the Republick, than the *Spaniſh* Power in *Italy*; for the Nature of the Pontifical Principality is Elective and Temporary, and the Aims and Deſigns of that Court vary according to the *Genius* of the ſeveral *Popes*; and ſometimes it is ſubject to long Vacancies: whereas the Monarchy of *Spain* is ſucceſſive, and, as one may ſay, Eternal, and govern'd by ſtanding laſting Maxims.

But

But if the Church be to grow great by the Spoils of any other *Italian* Prince, it would be the Interest of the Republick to oppose it, because the Damage thence resulting is evident, and the Advantage dangerous. It ought to be well consider'd, how the State of the Church is increased in this last Century. The custom that was in the Church before, to give *Infeodations* upon slight Acknowledgments, had brought that power to be more of show than real strength; but *Julius* the Second, succeeding *Alexander* the Sixth, made *Borgia*, Duke of *Volentine*, Nephew to *Alexander*, who had seiz'd upon all those *Infeodations* in *Romania*, refund them to the Church, and added to them the conquest of *Bologna*, and got also from the Republick the Cities of *Cervia*, *Rimini*, *Ravenna*, *Faenza*, *Imola*, and others, to which under *Clement* the Eighth, was added the whole Dutchy of *Ferrara*,

Ferrara, and lately that of *Urbin*: So that these Acquisitions alone would make up a great *Principality*: and the Church seems to want nothing towards the making of it the most considerable power of *Italy*, than the addition of *Parma* and *Piacenza*, and some little Independent Castles in the Territories about *Rome*: Besides, it can never more be lessen'd by *Infeodations*, that being quite left off by that Court: So that to let the Church grow any greater in *Italy*, generally speaking, cannot be for the Interest of the *Venetian* Republick.

To the Second Point, *What Title, Inclination or Facility the Church may have to acquire any portion of the State of the Republick*, we shall say, That since the Court makes profession of the Extreamest Justice, and that likewise they are loth to begin the Example of Princes usurping upon one another,

ther, I think they can hardly ſet up any Title but upon the *Poleſine* of *Rovigo*, which they ſay was formerly annex'd to the Dutchy of *Ferrara*; and in the times that the Diſpute was between the Dukes of *Ferrara* and the Republick, the *Popes* always ſhewed themſelves ſmart Defenders of the Dukes: Of Four Interdicts publiſhed by the Church againſt the *Venetians*, Two of them were for this very cauſe, the firſt in the year 1305. the Second in the year 1483. under *Sixtus* the Fourth, at which time indeed the Republick had taken the whole Dutchy of *Ferrara*, by the Inſtigation of the *Pope* himſelf; but he being Friends with the Duke, commanded them to reſtore what they had taken, which they refuſing to do, he fulminated his Excommunication and Interdict; but a Peace following, the Republick kept by agreement the *Poleſine* of *Rovigo*: The Third Interdict

dict was in 1505. under *Julius* the Second, becauſe the Republick had ſeveral Cities of *Romania* in their poſſeſſions, and the laſt of all was now lately under *Paul* the Fifth: So that if the *Popes* ſhewed ſuch a concern for the thing when it was only belonging to the Dukes of *Ferrara*, much more would they do it now when the profit would be their own: So that we may believe that as to this they do own a Title, and have likewiſe inclination enough to regain this bit of Territory that is lopp'd off from them. We are therefore to conſider what Facility they have to do it; and I do not believe that ever of themſelves they will kindle the fire, but make advantage of one ready kindled by ſome other, as it happened under *Julius* the Second: Nay, if they reflect upon the great Rule of preſerving the Liberty of *Italy*, they will not for ſo ſmall a matter enter

ter into a League againſt the Republick; for it is of greater concern to them not to break the Ballance of Dominion in *Italy*, leſt the *Tramontani* ſhould take advantage of it, and ſubdue all.

But this very Reaſon was ſtrong in Pope *Julius* the Second's time, and yet was without Effect in a Mind bent all upon particular Intereſt; wherefore I conclude, that we are not to expect greater Temper in the Modern *Popes*, but ought to reſt ſatisfied, that if a powerful Foreign Prince ſhould promiſe them the acquiſition of the State of the Republick, they would embrace the motion without delay.

To the Third Queſtion, I ſay, That the Republick might have juſt Reaſon to make themſelves amends for the Country they loſt in *Romagna*, it not being a thing they had uſurp'd from the Church, but a voluntary Dedition of thoſe Cities who were tyranniz'd over by little

little Tyrants, that had taken occaſion from the Negligence of *Popes* to make themſelves Maſters of thoſe places: They were yielded up by the Republick, to take off *Julius* the Second, who was the great Fomentour of the Fire which was kindled againſt the *Venetians* in the League of *Cambray*, where the Forces of all the Princes of *Chriſtendom* were united againſt them; and without doubt, upon good circumſtances the Republick might juſtifie the re-taking of theſe Towns; and I believe there is Inclination enough to do it, all Princes being willing to extend their Territories; but the point is the Facility of doing it, which I think altogether remote; for all other *Italian* Princes, if not out of conſcience, yet out of Oſtentation of Religion, would be backward to fall upon the Church; and except it ſhould happen that ſome one of them ſhould grow too powerful for

all

all the others united, and so be able to right himself, I think the State of the Church need not fear being lessen'd.

To the Fourth Question, I answer in the Negative, and do not believe that the Church would joyn with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Prince, except it were such a one as the Church had a pretence upon, and then they would keep all, which would not please the Republick: Besides, we ought to reflect upon the *Genius* of the *Popedom*, which being Elective, most commonly the *Popes* have no other aim than to keep all quiet, and preserve the general Respect of Princes towards them, that in that decrepit Age they may make their Families, their thoughts being far from enlarging a Dominion which they expect to leave every day; and in the mean time, all the ready Money, which else they might lay

lay up, would go upon projects of a very uncertain Event: And 'tis a wonderful thing that *Julius* the Second, being of a very mean Birth, ſhould have had ſo great a Sence of the Publick Intereſt of the Church, as to forego all his private concerns, and take the Empty Praiſes of his Courtiers in payment for the loſs of ſuch real advantages as he might have made to his Family.

The laſt Query depends, in a great meaſure, upon the others. I do not think it would be eaſie to concert the Union of the *Pope* with other Princes, in order to attack the Republick, becauſe it will never be advantageous to the Church to increaſe the power of that other Prince, neither will it look like the Juſtice they profeſs, to take to themſelves alone the Spoils, except it be upon a Country on which they have a pretence. 'Tis true, that in thoſe ways of Excommunications

munications where they deprive Princes of their Dominions, and give them to others that can take them, there might be ſome danger; but they are ſeldom practiz'd but in an Attempt made by a Prince upon the Church, which is never to be feared from the Piety and Moderation of the Republick. There is no doubt but the Church would enter into a League to hinder any progreſs of the Republick, particularly againſt any Dependant of theirs; and alſo in caſe the Republick attack'd ſome ſmall Prince, the *Popes*, to affect the protection of the weak, would declare; but if the Republick had to do with a ſtrong Prince, the Church would look on, for fear of greatning too much that Prince, the rather, becauſe the Republick can lay claim to none of thoſe Old tickliſh Titles which ſome other Princes might ſet a-foot againſt the Church. And ſo much for the *Pope*.

Now

Now let us come to the Emperour: The Republick muſt never forget that Maxim which is common to all Princes bordering upon the Empire, which is, *That it is not convenient for them to ſee the Emperour made more powerful, leſt he renew thoſe antiquated Titles he has to moſt Dominions near him, and particularly in* Italy.

The power of the *Roman* Commonwealth, which extended almoſt over all the known World, being at laſt uſurp'd by *Julius Cæſar*, and from him deriv'd to a long *Series* of ſucceeding Emperours, might give the *German* Emperour a pretext to reckon with all the Princes of *Europe*, if he were ſtrong enough; and perhaps many who wear Crowns, would be reduc'd to Beggary; therefore 'tis beſt to keep him in his cold Country of *Germany*, where mens Spirits are benumm'd, and leſs undertaking. The Republick has

Reaſon

Reaſon to diſtruſt him upon many Heads; as Emperour he has pretences upon the Dutchy of *Frioul*, and the *Marca Treviſana*, beſides the Cities of *Treviſa*, *Padoua*, *Vicenza* and *Verona*: As Arch-Duke, he pretends to *Iſtria*: As King of *Hungary*, to *Zara*, and the neighbouring Country: So that his Titles and Neighbourhood are conſiderably dangerous; all theſe Countries are beſides of greater Antiquity than the City of *Venice* it ſelf: So that their being ſubject to a *Metropolis* of a younger ſtanding, gives ſome ſuſpicion of the Lawfulneſs of their Subjection. All theſe pretences were renewed in the League of *Cambray*; Therefore I think, without heſitation, I may pronounce, That it is the Intereſt of the Republick that the Emperour ſhould be kept low, both for General and Particular Reaſons.

From these Reflections we may also conclude, that the Emperour to these Titles does not want Inclination to acquire a part of the Territories of the Republick; particularly it being yet a complaint of that Prince, of the little Respect shew'd him by the Republick, when taking advantage of his Distractions, they Erected the Fortress of *Palma Nuova* just under his Nose.

There remains therefore to see what Facility he might find in such an Attempt. In the present State of his Affairs, while the Faction of the *Protestants* is so strong in *Germany*, I cannot think that he can quarrel with the Republick, which is as powerful in Money as he is in Men: For in length of time 'tis certain, that he who has Money may have Men, and they who have many Men must consume much Money: 'Tis true, he being so near a Borderer upon the Republick,

lick, it may give him the more confidence, becauſe a leſſer Number will be neceſſary to make the Invaſion; but if the Enterprize be not in the Name of the whole Empire, in which caſe the whole *German* Nation would be a party, I believe, with the help of his own Patrimonial Dominions, he will not do any great matter, the rather, becauſe many great Heretical Princes and Cities of *Germany* have the ſame Intereſt to keep him low: So that as he might perhaps be pretty ſmart upon an Invaſion or Incurſion, at length of time he would prove as weak to hold out a War: And indeed this was the true cauſe of Erecting the Fortreſs of *Palma Nuova*, to obviate a ſudden Incurſion of his Forces, and provide a Retreat for the Country-people; ſo to gain time, which is always as advantageous to the Republick, as dangerous to ſuch an Enemy, who if he have not ſome body to furniſh

him with Money, will get but little ground, tho his Army be numerous, as it was in the time of *Maximilian*.

Now whether the Republick has any Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire any part of the Emperour's Territories? I anſwer, That without doubt the Republick has pretences upon *Goritia* and *Gradiſca*, which formerly belong'd to the Family of the *Frangipani*, and for a little while was under the Government of the Republick: There are likewiſe ſome Caſtles in *Iſtria*, and upon the Coaſt which the Republick claims; and for an Inclination to acquire theſe, we need not doubt but the Republick has it, it being either the Vertue or Vice of Princes never to be without it: But ſtill the great conſideration lies in the Facility of doing it; for if there be that, 'tis above half the Title; and if that is wanting, 'tis Imprudence to own any part of a pretence that

muſt

must remain without Execution. I believe by Sea it would prove easie to take *Trieste*, and some other places, but it would be as hard to maintain them; and to go further into the Land, would need great preparatives on the side of the Republick: whereas on the Emperour's side, the Defence would be easie, he having a command of Men: So that except in an open War, there is no thinking of any strong Attempt that way, and then it were not amiss to put a good strength to it, that at the end of the War, which always must one time or another be succeeded by Peace, some of the Country might remain by Treaty in the *Venetians* Hands, for the charges of the War; for to begin a War only for the acquisition of these places, would not be a Deliberation befitting the Wisdom and Gravity of the *Venetian* Senate: It would be better to watch the occasion of some Ex-

tremity or Pinch of an Emperour, which often happens, and buy these places; but then be aware that if it be not a Patrimonial Estate, the consent of the Dyet is necessary to the purchase, to cut off all claims in time to come.

'Tis as hard, that the Emperour should unite with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Prince in *Italy*, because, first, for *Spain*, they are the same Family with the Emperour; Against the Church he will declare as little, professing a great Zeal for it, and calling himself, *The Churches Advocate*; *Modena*, *Mantoua* and *Mirandola* are Fiefs of the Empire; *Savoy* and *Florence* are remote from him, and to come at them he must overcome greater Princes that are between him and them: so that this Union would prove difficult. If the Emperour should fall out with some of these Dukes, his Vassals, and depose them, it might happen that

that if *Spain* were buſie elſewhere, and the Emperour loth to take the trouble of chaſtiſing them himſelf alone, he might then unite with the Republick, upon condition to have the beſt part of the Spoil; but if the Emperour ſhould, as formerly, come to a great Rupture with the Church, and employ heartily his power in the Quarrel, 'tis not impoſſible but he might be willing to engage the Republick by a promiſe of ſome part of the conqueſt. I think in any other way 'tis not probable to make any advantage of the Imperial Aſſiſtance.

The laſt Queſtion is, *Whether he can unite with others againſt the Republick*? And of this there is no doubt: For if *Maximilian*, tho infinitely oblig'd to the Republick, made no difficulty to unite in a League with *Lewis* the Twelfth of *France*, his Competitor and Enemy, whom, for Injuries received, he had

declared a Rebel to the Sacred Empire (tho *Lewis* laugh'd at that Imaginary Juriſdiction): I ſay, if he could ſubmit to joyn with ſo ſuſpected a power, much leſs would the Emperour now ſcruple the uniting either with *Spain* or the *Pope*, or any other Princes of *Italy*, not only for to acquire Territory, but even for bare Money, if it were offer'd him. With *France* I believe the Union would not be ſo eaſie as it was then, becauſe now the Emperour, being partial for *Spain*, if their Intereſt did not concur, they would hinder him from being drawn away by any hopes or promiſes: But this will appear better when we come to treat of *Spain*: For if *Spain* will have a League againſt the Republick, the Emperour will never ſtand out.

Now let us come to *France*:

'Tis not above Fifty years ago that the Republick thought themſelves

ſelves oblig'd not only to deſire, but to procure the Greatneſs of *France*, becauſe being under the phrenſie of a Civil War, it threatned little leſs than the diſſolution of that Monarchy: The Succeſſion of *Henry* the Fourth to the Crown, who had his Title from Nature, and the Poſſeſſion from his Sword, reviv'd it, and at laſt gave it ſuch vigour, that from deſerving Compaſſion, it came to move Envy; and if a fatal blow of a mean hand had not cut off that Prince's Life, and Deſigns, there would have been requiſite great Dexterity, or great Force to defend the Republick from them. The *Count de Fuentes*, Governour of *Milan*, us'd to brag, that he had ſuch Muſick as ſhould make thoſe dance who had no mind to't: *Henry* the Fourth might have ſaid ſo with much more reaſon, and he us'd to affirm, That at the paſs things were, the Neutrality of the Republick was a Coyn that would no long-

er be current. If he had given career to his no ill-founded Designs, half a World would not have ſuffic'd him; but we muſt not be frighted if we ſee the Raging Sea ſwell in Billows, and look as if it would ſwallow up the Earth, ſince a little Sand ſtops all its Fury. *Death* has a Scythe that moſt commonly cuts off all the Nobleſt Lives: If *Henry* the Third of *France*, had brought the Siege of *Paris* to an end; if *Philip* the Second had not had the Winds and Seas againſt him, *England* would have been in Chains, and *Paris* would have been a Village. In concluſion, the Fatality of Humane Affairs is ſuch, that moſt great undertakings are diſappointed by unexpected cauſes. At preſent the conſtitution of *France* is ſuch, that there is little danger from them; for during the Minority of their King, they will have enough to do not to loſe ground, there being ſo many Jealouſies and Factions afoot:

foot. 'Tis true, that the common people have open'd their Eyes, and begin to be weary of ſpending their blood for the ambition of the great ones; and amongſt theſe, the chief-eſt are old, and at their eaſe, ſo that they will think chiefly of keeping themſelves in thoſe Poſts they enjoy. The Duke of *Maine*, who is Head of the *Catholick* Party, is very ancient and very rich; wherefore if in the time of the great troubles, he either could not or would not aſpire to make himſelf King, when even he had all but the Name of it, 'tis not to be imagined he thinks of it now; and if he will be content with the State of a Subject, he is as great as he can be. The Duke of *Mercœur*, who in his Wife's right pretended to Erect *Britany* into a Kingdom, is at laſt dead in *Hungary*; the Duke of *Epernon* is more ſtudious of good Husbandry than Soldiery; the Duke of *Montpenſier* has always been true to the Royal Family; the *Capricio*

of

of the Marchioness of *Aumale*, will hardly have any Followers; and it will be well if she can clear her self of the late King's Death. On the other side, the Prince of *Conde*, the first Prince of the Blood, is young, and of a mild Nature; he has besides before his Eyes the Example of his Father, Grandfather, and Great Grandfather, who all perish'd unfortunately in civil Broils, and has in his own person experimented the *Spanish Parsimony*, in his Retreat from Court to *Brussels*: So that if he desires a greater Fortune, he may compass it in *France*, from the hands of the Queen her self, who is so ill a *Politician*, as to try to put out Fire with pouring Oyl upon it. The *Hugonots* are weary; the Duke of *Bovillon*, their Head, well pleased with his present Fortune; and if he have a mind to be a *Hugonot* out of Perswasion, and not Faction, there is no body will hinder him; but most of these great men have Religion only for

for a pretext, as 'tis reported likewiſe of the Duke *de Leſdiguieres*, which if it be true, they will never be quiet till the King be of Age; and by conſequence, there will be little protection to be hop'd for from that Kingdom. Our Speculation therefore may more certainly conclude, that the Greatneſs of *France* is at a ſtand, and cannot in the ſpace of ſome years make any progreſs, and till it come to an Exceſs not to be thought on for theſe fifty years, it can give no Jealouſie to the Republick.

As to the Title, Inclination and Facility that *France* may have to acquire any part of the Republick's Dominions; I ſay, we need not doubt of their Inclination, becauſe Princes are like Wolves to one another, always ready for prey. As for Title, they can ſet up none till they have conquer'd the Dutchy of *Milan*; and Facility they have as little, becauſe they cannot come at the

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Republick's Territories, without first passing over those of other Princes, which they will never consent to, lest they prove the first conquest themselves: Whereupon I conclude, that for a long time the power of *France* can give no jealousie to the Republick.

And on the other side, the Republick can have no pretences, as things stand, upon any part of the *French* Territories, as long as they are totally Excluded from *Italy*; and if there be no Title, there is less Inclination and Facility.

The Union of *France* with the Republick, to acquire the State of any other Prince, will always be easie when *France* is in a condition to mind such acquisitions; the past Examples prove that sufficiently; but they do sufficiently bear Testimony likewise of the danger of such Union: Now that the *French* are totally excluded *Italy*, they would agree to very large conditions with the Republick,

publick, and allow them a great ſhare of the Kingdom of *Naples* and Dutchy of *Milan*; but they would no ſooner have made the acquiſition of their ſhare, but they would begin to caſt their Eyes upon that of the Republick, and enter into a League againſt them with ſome other Prince, juſt as it happened in the time of *Lewis* the Twelfth, when to gain *Crémona*, he was the firſt that conſented to the League of *Cambray*, deceiving all the while the *Venetian* Embaſſador at Court, and affirming (even with Oaths), That he would never conclude any thing to the prejudice of the Republick, tho he had ſign'd the League above ſix weeks before the War began, which he exerciſed likewiſe in a moſt barbarous manner, hanging up the Noble *Venetians* that were Governours of the Towns he took.

I believe *France*, to get footing in *Italy*, would engage with any other Prince againſt the Republick, except with

with the *Spaniard*; and if that ſhould happen, it would be neceſſary to ſtir up the Factions of that Kingdom, and bring upon them ſome powerful Neighbour, ſuch as *England*: The Friendſhip of *Savoy* would likewiſe be uſeful, to hinder the Paſſes of the Mountains, and make ſome diverſion in *Provence* and *Dauphine*, if there could be any relying upon this preſent Duke; but he is a *Proteus*, that turns himſelf into many forms, and with his *Capricio's* and Humours, would ſoon empty the Treaſures of *S. Marc*. But theſe are things ſo remote, that they may be left to the prudence of thoſe who ſhall live in thoſe times; for according to the Times there muſt be alteration of Councils. And ſo much for *France*.

Now let us turn to *Spain*,

A Family that from low beginnings, is come by Marriages to the poſſeſſion of Twelve Kingdoms, and ſeveral Dukedoms in *Europe*, beſides what

what it has in the *Indies*, does certainly evidence a great Favour of Fortune, joyn'd with great application and industry: So that if it be not ſtopp'd by Fatality, may bid fair for an Univerſal Empire: If *Charles* the Fifth had had as much prudence in his youth as he had in his old Age, he would not have ſeparated the Empire from *Spain*, but would have made his Son *Philip* have been choſen King of the *Romans*, inſtead of his Brother *Ferdinand*: He underſtood his Errour, and repented of it at laſt, trying to perſwade *Ferdinand* to a Renunciation; but he ſhew'd as much prudence in keeping what he had got ſo wonderfully into his Hands, as *Charles* would have ſhew'd folly in going to deprive him of it by Force. *Charles* was not leſs unhappy in the other Act of Moderation he ſhew'd, when he renounc'd all his Kingdoms to his Son, and retired to a private Life; For to one

who

who on the Anniversary Day of that Famous Action, congratulated King *Philip* for his Felicity, he answered, That Day was likewise the Anniversary of his Father's Repentance: So that Actions of Moderation in Princes, are but like that Insect called the *Ephemera*, which lives and dies the same day.

The Greatness of *Spain* is therefore to be suspected; it has Two Wild Beasts that follow it always close, one on one side, and the other on the other, which is the *Turk* by Sea, and *France* by Land; and besides that it has that Issue of *Holland*, as witty *Boccalini* calls it, which will sufficiently purge it of all its ill Humours; and it must be own'd, that all the *Spanish* Sagacity has not hindered them from following the Fable of the Dog, who forsook the Substance for the Shadow: For, for Forty years together, *France* was sufficiently taken up with their own Intestine Broils, during

during which time *Spain* might with great advantage have made a Truce with *Holland*; and having likewise humbled the *Turk*, by the Battle of *Lepanto*, they might have applied their whole Force to *Italy*, which had no Defence but its own Natives, and not of them above half: So that in all probability they could have met with no considerable opposition.

One might say, That it was an Effect of King *Philip*'s Moderation, if he had not shew'd as great an Ambition of Dominion as possible, in endeavouring first to unite *France* to *Spain* by conquest, then to have his Daughter chosen Queen, and lastly, seiz'd upon as many Towns as he could; Therefore we may give the *Italians* Joy, that half an Age of so much danger passed without the least loss of their Liberty. Now by reason of the *French* King's Minority, the

Jea-

Jealouſies againſt *Spain* are a-foot again, but, I think, not with ſo much ground; For if not *France*, at leaſt *England*, would raiſe their old Enemies, the *Dutch* particularly, if the *Italians* ſhould help with Money: So that if *Italy* can but reſiſt the firſt brunt, it may hope for all ſort of Relief; for *France* has Forces, and they would ſoon have a will to ſuccour *Italy* againſt *Spain*: Neither do I believe, that *Spain* would hazard the Truce with *Holland*, it having been compaſs'd with ſuch Difficulties, even to the loſs of much of their Honour and Faſt. 'Tis enough, that to all other Chriſtian Princes, except the Emperour, the Greatneſs of *Spain* is of ill Conſequence; And therefore to be oppoſed by all ſecret means firſt, and if need be, at laſt openly, and without a Mask.

If *Spain* has any Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire part of the

the Republick's Dominions, there will be little Difficulty to anſwer: Their Title would be upon *Breſcia*, *Crema*, and *Bergamo*, ancient Members of the Dutchy of *Milan*: And theſe Three Cities are ſo conſiderable, that with their Territory, they would perhaps make up as rich a Dutchy as any in *Lombardy*, except *Milan*: So that we need not doubt, but the *Spaniard* looks upon theſe Cities with an Amorous Eye, and with great Deſire to enjoy them; there remains only the Facility of doing it, which is always the moſt important of the Three Points: Upon this Subject we muſt diſtinguiſh whether they will make the Attempt by themſelves, or in Conjunction with others: If alone, and that the Republick have any Great Prince, either *Italian*, or Foreigner on their ſide, they will meet with little Facility in their Deſigns, becauſe the Republick's Mo-

Money, joyn'd to the Forces of another Prince, can give check to almoſt any great Power, and particularly to that of *Spain*, whoſe States and Poſſeſſions are large, but diſunited; and they cannot but be afraid, that while they are buſied in *Lombardy*, others would try to attack them in a more ſenſible part: If *Spain* ſhould therefore unite with any other Prince, provided the Republick had *France* on their ſide, they would not much hurt it, becauſe the Inundation of the *French* into *Lombardy*, uſes to be both powerful and ſudden, provided they be called in by an *Italian* Prince of ſome Figure; and by that means the *Spaniard* being attack'd on Two ſides, would go near to loſe his Dutchy of *Milan*.

But if we conſider the Republick united only with ſome *Italian* Prince, and the *French* to ſtand Spectator, as might happen in the Mi-

Minority of a *French* King, particularly if the *Spaniard* had the Pope and Emperour of his ſide, I doubt the Republick would be hard ſet; for that other Prince in League with them, cannot be of any great Force; the moſt uſeful would be *Savoy*; but beſides, that he would be bought very dear, he would be always wavering, if the *Spaniards* tempted him ſtrongly: The Richeſt would be *Florence*; but his Territories not joyning upon thoſe of the Republick, there is little good to be expected from his aſſiſtance. Laſtly, If *Spain* will fall upon the Republick alone, and the Republick be likewiſe alone, I ſay, That as to the State of *Terra Firma*, it would go near to be loſt; but by Sea the Republick would make a ſtout Reſiſtance.

But if it be ask'd, whether the Republick have either Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire any part

part of the *Spaniſh* Dominions in *Italy*? I anſwer, the Title would be upon *Cremona* in *Lombardy*, and upon *Travi*, and other Ports of *La Puglia*, in the Kingdom of *Naples*, the Republick having been in Poſſeſſion of all theſe places before ever *Spain* had footing in *Italy*: So that there wants nothing but Facility; and there is but one Caſe that I know in which the Republick might hope to get Poſſeſſion again; and that is, in caſe the Republick were in League with *France*, and the Emperour buſied by the *Proteſtants* of *Germany*, then ſome of theſe Expectations might be fulfilled, but ſtill with the ſame Jealouſie, that your Friends ſhould at laſt joyn with your Enemies to fall upon the Republick, as it happened in the League of *Cambray*. And this anſwers the other Queſtion, to wit, *Whether* Spain *can unite with any other Power againſt the Republick*? 'Tis very true, that I can hardly believe, that the *Spaniards* would,

would, without any precedent broil, attempt a League with *France* againſt the Republick, becauſe the Damage of one City's remaining in the *French* Hands, would be greater to them than the profit of taking all the Republick has in *Terra Firma* would amount to.

Whether the *Spaniard* may unite with the Republick, to acquire conjoyntly in *Italy*; I ſay, That if it be againſt an *Italian* Prince, they will not, becauſe it is not their Intereſt that the Republick ſhould be greater, and already almoſt all the leſſer Princes are Dependants of that Monarchy: and as for the Pope, they would certainly help him, rather than joyn againſt him, being us'd to make a great ſhew of their protecting the Church: The only caſe that would make them bear patiently any new Acquiſitions of the Republick, would be, if *France* ſhould make any progreſs in *Italy*.

After all, amidst so many well-grounded suspicions, it must be confessed, that the Neighbourhood of *Spain* has prov'd of less disturbance to the Republick, than that of any other Prince who had those Countries before them; for the Dukes of *Milan* were perpetually either quarrelling, or, finding themselves too weak, were inciting of other Powers under-hand against the Republick.

There may be an Union likewise of the Republick and *Spain* by Sea, against the *Turk*, and by Land against the *Grisons*, or any other *Hereticks*. And this is enough for *Spain*.

Now by reason of Vicinity, we will speak of the other *Italian* Princes: It would be the Interest of the Republick to see them greater, if it could be done at the Expence of *Spain*, and by their Spoils, as also by getting from the Church: But both those Cases are next to impossible-

ſible, if firſt the World be not turn'd topſy turvy, which can never be, but by a League with *France*; and then if any part of the *Spaniards* Dominions could be ſhar'd amongſt them, it would not injure the Republick at all: but for any of theſe Princes to grow great by ſpoiling one another, I ſhould not like it; for the advantage would be inconſiderable, and in the mean time the fire would be kindled in *Italy*, the property of which is to go not where you would have it, but often where you are moſt afraid of it.

Whether any of theſe Princes have Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire from the Republick, the conſideration will be ſhort, becauſe Facility will be wanting. *Mantoua* has ſome pretences upon *Valeſa* and *Peſchiera*; *Modena* upon the Town of *Eſte*, from whence the Family comes: But all theſe little Princes united without the Pope and *Spain*, could hardly give a diſturbance to the Re-

publick, becauſe the Two powerfulleſt of them, to wit, *Savoy* and *Florence*, are not immediate Borderers.

Whether the Republick have either Title, Inclination or Facility to acquire from them in the State they now are in; I anſwer, That the Houſe of *Eſte* not having *Ferrara*, the Republick has no Title to either *Modena* or *Reggio*: There would indeed be a good Inclination againſt *Mantoua*, becauſe he lies, as it were, in the Bowels of the Republick; but there would be but an ill Title, except the Republick ſhould bear the Charges of his Education, while they were his Guardians; and then the Facility would be ſmall; for no ſooner would the Republick have begun the Dance, but others would come in, and perhaps it would not end as it begun. Of the other Princes I have little to ſay, the Republick having had no diſputes with them; for the *Genoueſes*, who formerly ſet the

the Republick ſo hard, have done as the Horſe in the Fable, loſt their own Liberty, in hopes of being victorious of their Enemies, and are by that means out of power to hurt the Republick.

As for Leagues theſe Princes will be ready to make them either with or againſt the Republick, becauſe their Fortune, as Princes, being but ſmall, they will let ſlip no occaſion of mending it, either by acquiſition of new Territory, or by receiving Subſidies and Penſions. *Florence* only would hardly be mov'd by that laſt motive, becauſe he is not needy, being at this time perhaps the Richeſt Prince in ready Money that is in Chriſtendom; and his Riches always increaſe, becauſe the Princes of that Family do yet retain their Anceſtors Inclination to Merchandize, and that enriches the Prince without damage to the Subject. The Dominions of the great Duke are conſiderable, as well becauſe they are placed

as it were in the Navel of *Italy*, with a fertile Territory, all united together, as also because the States of other Princes are, as it were, a Wall and Defence to it; and it is besides, to be valued by the Communication it has with the Sea by *Leghorn*, and some other *Maritime* Fortresses: So that if one were to reckon upon any *Italian* Prince, I know none that deserves so well, as being exempted from the temptation of being bought, and having yet some of that punctual mercantile Faith.

If the Republick will have a League with any of the other *Italian* Princes, there will be no difficulty in it, provided they pay them; but withal, one must not forget the witty Reflection of *Boccalini*, when the *Italian* Princes are willing to be taught manners out of the *Galateo*, provided that it may not look like ill breeding in them, to eat with both Jaws as fast as they can.

With

With *Poland* the Republick can have no other Concern than that of defending Chriſtendom, and by ſome diverſion from that Crown, bear the more eaſily the weight of the *Ottoman* Power: Therefore it would be well for the Republick to have that King and Kingdom grow more powerful. As for any thing elſe, the great diſtance that is between that State and the Republick, takes away all matter of any further Conſideration. The ſame thing may be ſaid of the *Moſcovite*.

England being the greateſt of thoſe powers that are ſeparated from the Church of *Rome*, is a Kingdom of great ſtrength, particularly ſince the Union of *Scotland*; and the Kings of *England* have nothing left to deſire as to Territory: All that Iſland is now under the Dominion of one ſole Monarch, and has the Sea for a Wall: So that if *England* be not diſunited within it ſelf, there is no power to overcome it: We ſee the Example in

the Invaſion of *Philip* the Second of *Spain* (and yet then the Union was not ſo great as might have been) who loſt his mighty *Armada* that he had been ſo long preparing at ſuch vaſt Expences. Queen *Elizabeth*, who has ſhew'd the World how far a Woman's ability can go in Government, did likewiſe enlarge her Dominions by Navigations to the *Indies*, and wounded *Spain* in that tender part; She likewiſe had ſome Ports of the *Low-Countries* conſign'd to her, ſo that ſhe ſeem'd to be hardly contain'd in that ſeparate World of hers. The Iſland is fertile and delicious, producing all neceſſaries for Life, and though the Natives go abroad and buy the Products of other Countries, it is more as Superfluities, and out of Luxury, than want, and amongſt the reſt, they have a Trade for Grapes called Currans, which they buy in the Dominions of the Republick. *Henry* the Eighth, who

was

was the King that Apoſtatiz'd from the Church of *Rome*, did uſe to concern himſelf in the Affairs of *Italy*, and ſeveral times the Popes have had good Protection from the ancient Kings of that Country, who were moſt devoted to the See of *Rome*; to ſay truth, Religion has had a great Loſs, and the Court of *Rome* a greater, I cannot well ſay, whether out of the great Luſt of *Henry* the Eighth, or the little conſideration of *Clement* the Seventh, at preſent that King will not hear of *Rome*, and has but ſmall Curioſity for the Affairs of *Italy*.

If this King could grow greater, it would be advantageous to the Republick, becauſe it might obtain his Alliance, and by that means a greater reſpect from other Crown'd Heads; but however, even without this conſideration, 'tis a Power to be courted, becauſe the Nation having an ancient Antipathy to *France*, and a modern one

to *Spain*, it cannot but have a good inclination for the Republick. 'Tis true that the preſent King is more enclin'd to Wars with his Pen, than with his Sword, having a mighty Love for Diſputes, and valuing himſelf upon the Character of a Notable Divine; ſo much has the Quarrel with *Rome* influenc'd that Country, that even their Princes ſtudy Controverſie; but however I ſhould not think the Republick ought to mind any of thoſe Circumſtances, becauſe where there is ſtrength, there is always hopes of making uſe of it, that depending only upon raiſing of Paſſions.

The beſt means would be (beſides the continuation of thoſe Offices already introduc'd of mutual Embaſſies) ſtrictly to command the Governours in the *Levant* to ſhew all good uſage to the *Engliſh* Merchants, and particularly obſerve punctually all Treaties and Engagements with them, becauſe there is

no

no Nation that puts a greater value upon their Word than the *English* do, and the Kings of that Iſland have not yet learnt the modern Policy that gives them leave to break their Faith in order to reigning more abſolutely.

With the Seven United Provinces 'twill be good to cultivate Friendſhip, and to encreaſe it by a mutual defenſive League, particularly at this time, that the Truce is but newly concluded with *Spain*; for it will be a Curb upon the *Spaniard*, if he ſhould attempt any thing againſt the Republick, for fear his old Wounds ſhould be ſet a bleeding again, they being but juſt bound up, and not healed.

'Tis feaſable likewiſe to procure ſomething more of Trade with the *Hollanders*, becauſe they are extremely ingenious, and addicted that way; and moreover, ſince both the Republicks ſtand in awe of the ſame Power, it will not be

difficult

difficult to unite their inclinations; and they have made on their ſide a ſufficient Advance, by ſending an Embaſſy to the Republick, which though of Complement, yet it has ſhew'd great eſteem and inclination to an Union.

Beſides the Advantage of a ſolid diverſion of the Forces of *Spain*, there is another Eſſential conſideration, which is, That from them might be had a conſiderable Body of well diſciplin'd Soldiers, and that with admirable celerity, beſides ſeveral Regiments that might be rais'd in a Country ſo well us'd to War, if there were occaſion, and all the inconveniencies of Tranſportation are not to be valued; for the Republick will always have a greater ſcarcity of good Soldiers, than of good Money.

With the Princes of *Germany* of a different Religion, there can hardly be any Concerns, if there is no room for Quarrels. As the World

World ſtands now, if it be not well, they ſhould grow greater, at leaſt 'tis not amiſs, they are already great enough, becauſe they are a Check upon the Emperour, who elſe would be a moſt formidable Potentate to all Princes, but more particularly to the *Italians*, and more to the Republick, than to the reſt of *Italy*; but now by their means his Power is not only balanced, but almoſt quite oppreſſed to the common benefit of other Princes. With theſe Princes it will be eaſie for the Republick to have an Engagement: Firſt, becauſe they know that the Republick is not a blind Adorer of the Intereſts of the Court of *Rome*: And, Secondly, becauſe they ſee the Jealouſies that are between the Republick and the Emperour, from whence they conclude, that there is no danger of a League between them and the Emperour, and by conſequence, they have not the Republick for a ſuſpected

cted Power; and upon all Occurrences, it will do well to ſhew an Inclination to Friendſhip with them, firſt, becauſe they may make a potent diverſion; and, ſecondly, becauſe their Country being a Nurſery of Soldiers, the Republick upon occaſion may make Levies there; and it is a point of high importance for the Republick to be certain of their Levies; for in a time of need they can hope but for ſmall help from the *Italian Militia.*

I have not yet ſaid any thing of the Duke of *Bavaria*; and he is not to be omitted, being ſo much a dependant of the Emperour, from whom he has received the Electoral Dignity, upon the Excluſion of the Elector *Palatin*: This Prince has had the boldneſs to conteſt the Precedency with the Republick at the Council of *Trent*; and therefore no good Correſpondency can be between him and the Republick. It would

would not be amiſs to ſee him leſſen'd; for 'tis always to be wiſh'd, that he who has no good Intentions, ſhould have as little power to offend as may be.

The Order of *Malta*, who are Pyrating Princes, is likewiſe to be minded; and their growth in Power can be of no uſe to the Republick: They do nothing but waken the *Ottoman* Power, when 'tis almoſt lull'd aſleep; and therefore are dangerous: Their Friendſhip, in time of open War with the *Turk*, will be eaſily had, upon the Hopes of a good Booty.

It remains for us now to ſpeak of the greateſt Prince of this known World, formidable to all other Princes, I mean the *Turk*; but we cannot ſpeak of him by the Rules we have laid down for the others; for with him all Arts and Policies are vain: He makes no League with any,

any, neither has he any Reſiding Embaſſadors in any Court, ſcorning to deſcend to inform himſelf of other Princes Intrigues: He owns his Greatneſs, and relies upon it, like the Elephant, who by reaſon of his great ſtrength, is never obſerved to uſe Cunning: Perhaps it may be an *Arcanum* of the *Alchoran*, to hinder his Subjects from contracting the Manners and Cuſtoms of other Nations, and bringing them home at their return: Perhaps likewiſe that he is unwilling their Wits ſhould be refin'd in Politicks: His is an Empire built upon the Ruin of all other Empires, founded in force, and ſcorning Titles and Claims of Juſtice. If he can acquire a Country, he has always Right to it; and when he has conquer'd it, he aſſumes all the power to himſelf, ſuffering no Uſurpations where he himſelf uſurps all: His Miniſters make open profeſſion of Ignorance, which is propagated induſtriouſly amongſt his

his people, who are ſufficiently learned, if they know how to obey: They are told openly of their Slavery, and it is expected they learn the Obligations of it: not but that they will diſpute with Chriſtians for their Emperour, and alledge, That he ſucceeds to all the Rights of *Conſtantine*, whoſe City he has conquered. In his Religion the Prince is looſe, and the *Mufti*, which is the High Prieſt, tied up, who muſt ſpeak complacently to the Ends of the Government, and in conformity to the Will of him that rules, or pay his diſobedience with his Life. In this Monarchy all the Qualities of the Mind, both ſpeculative and practick, are deſpiſed and ſuſpected, which made one of their Emperours ſend back the Muſicians ſent him by *Francis* the Firſt, leſt with their Harmony they ſhould have molified the Iron Temper of thoſe fierce Natures: They value ſtrength of Body, and the Arts of War, in which none are

ſoon-

ſooner preferr'd than thoſe who ſhew the greateſt Fierceneſs and Inhumanity in their diſpoſitions: They are intent upon conquering the reſt of the World, and in order to it they have infinite Numbers of Men, and infinite Treaſure: His yearly Revenue exceeds Twenty Millions of Crowns; he inherits the Eſtates of all his Subjects, whoſe Children can lay claim to nothing but their Father's Horſe and Arms. In the midſt of all theſe Riches his thirſt of Gold ſtill increaſes: ſo that often his Fury is laid with the Charms of that Metal: Out of that has been ſaid, *'Tis evident that his Greatneſs muſt be the Ruine of all other Powers, and that it would be an unſpeakable Felicity to ſee him leſſen'd; but the hopes of that are ſo remote, that they are next to impoſſible.*

As for any Title upon the Territories of the Republick, he can have none; Inclination and Facility he has but too much, deſigning the Ruine

ine of all Chriſtendom; and conſidering the Diſunion of Chriſtians, more intent upon Jealouſies at home than upon an Union againſt a Foreign Invader, his Deſign is not above his Force: He fears nothing but an Union of Chriſtendom againſt him; and that he may not be negligent in providing againſt it, that cunning and wicked *Mahomet* has left him a Prophecy to keep him awake, by which, the Ruine of his Empire is to come from ſuch an Union: The *Turks* never mention it but with Cries and Groans; and the Government ſtrives to avoid it by being invincible, not conſidering, that if the Prophecy be true, 'tis unavoidable. As for the Republick, he is a terrible Neighbour to them, always encroaching, and ſetting no bounds to his pretences, till he has ſwallowed all.

The Republick, on the other ſide, cannot want a Title againſt him; for what he has taken from them, would make

make up a great Principality: *Cyprus*, *Negrepont*, *Modon*, *Coron*, *Caramania*, all the *Archipelago*, *Boſſina*, *Scutari*, *Albania*, part of the very Imperial City of *Conſtantinople*, and in ſhort, half his Empire in *Europe* has been at ſeveral times extorted from the Republick: but to get any of this back is the difficulty; and 'twill be well if he is content with what he has, and that we can ſave what remains. The only good thing the Republick can hope for, is, that the *Turk* will not enter into League with any other againſt the Republick, becauſe he ſcorns all Leagues: 'Tis true, that in the time of *Lodovico Sforza*, Duke of *Milan*, he was by him drawn to invade the Republick, and before that, by the *Viſconti*, Dukes of *Milan*, likewiſe with promiſe to buſie the *Venetians* in *Italy*, by a War on his ſide: 'Tis ſaid alſo, That *Lewis* the Twelfth ſtrove to draw him into the League of *Cambray*: But all theſe are rather Sub-

Subornations than Leagues, and ſpurring of a Horſe that's free enough of his own Nature.

He would eaſily unite with the Republick, to conquer other Princes; but then the Republick muſt reckon, that he would take all to himſelf, he not underſtanding any Accounts of dividing: So that it would only be a madneſs, and by ones own Expence of Blood and Treaſure, promote his Tyrannical Empire. The *Turk* has often offered Succours to the Republick in their Wars with others; but our wiſe Anceſtors always diſliked ſuch a Protector, but were glad he did not take the opportunity of their Troubles to fall upon them.

There is no other Politicks to be uſed with this Empire, than to profeſs Friendſhip, and reckon upon ſudden Enmity; and therefore be always provided, that the weakneſs of the State may not be an Invitation to him to uſe his Natural Rapacity;

ty; for the Peace will be always the longer, when the readineſs for War ſhall be viſible.

In caſe of a Rupture, one ſhould try to make a diverſion by the King of *Perſia*, the *Moſcovite* and the *Pole:* but that will be a long uncertain buſineſs, and of ſlow benefit; to corrupt the Miniſters of the Port in open War, will be a very hard thing, they will rather ſuffer a temptation in time of Peace, and by that means one may penetrate their Deſigns, and retard their Deliberations, provided the perſon gain'd be of the *Divan*, and particularly the *Grand Vizier*, if poſſible; but they often take Bribes, and deceive one; beſides, their being ſubject to continual Changes, and thoſe very ſudden, according to the Emperour's *Capricio*, and the Calumnies of their Competitors, the Friendſhip of the *Queen Mother*, and of the Wife of the *Grand Signior*, as alſo of the *Mufti*, may help: But if the Prince himſelf be

of

of a resolute Nature, their Offices will be but weak: And all violent sudden Resolutions of War made by the Emperour himself, are always welcome to the *Janizaries*, who are the Soul of that Empire: So that, as I said at first, I must conclude, That Prudence and Politicks can be of little use against Rage and Fury, and a Nation that depends not upon Reason, but upon Might.

I can say nothing then but what the Angel said to *Gideon*, *Comfortare & esto Robustus*; and with this good *Omen* that comes from Heaven, and which I offer with a most affectionate Mind,

I take leave, having accomplish'd the Task was imposed upon me, if not according to the full Extent of my Duty, at least in proportion to my weak Forces, and small Talent.

FINIS.